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The Relevance of the Principal-Agent Model for the Analysis of
Public Policies: Do the Objectives Conflict?
Florian Chatagny, IDHEAP, University of Lausanne, Switzerland
Nils Soguel, IDHEAP, University of Lausanne, Switzerland
Abstract: This paper aims to provide empirical support for the use of the principal-agent framework in the analysis of
public sector and public policies. After reviewing the different conditions to be met for a relevant analysis of the relationship
between population and government using the principal-agent theory, our paper focuses on the assumption of conflicting
goals between the principal and the agent. A principal-agent analysis assumes in effect that inefficiencies may arise because
principal and agent pursue different goals. Using data collected during an amalgamation project of two Swiss municipalities,
we show the existence of a gap between the goals of the population and those of the government. Consequently, inefficiencies
as predicted by the principal-agent model may arise during the implementation of a public policy, i.e. an amalgamation
project. In a context of direct democracy where policies are regularly subjected to referendum, the conflict of objectives
may even lead to a total failure of the policy at the polls.
Keywords: Principal-AgentModel, ConflictingGoals, Local Government, Public Policy, Amalgamation, Direct Democracy
Introduction
THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL is thecore analytical model of the economic theoryof incentives. An analysis in terms of a prin-
cipal and an agent supposes the delegation
of a task. This theory asserts that an asymmetry of
information may arise between the parties to a con-
tract of delegation thereby creating inefficiencies1.
Let us take the example of when one party to the
contract (the principal) mandates another party (the
agent) to accomplish a precise task. An asymmetry
of information arises if the agent has own goals that
cannot be observed or known by the principal. In
this case, the risk exists that the way in which the
agent achieves the task does not correspond to the
way preferred by the principal and will correspond
instead to the agent's objectives (Mas-Colell, et al.
1995: 447-489)2. Hence, as Laffont and Martimort
state :”delegation of a task to an agent who has dif-
ferent objectives than the principal who delegates
this task is problematic when information about the
agent is imperfect” (2002: 2). Delegation of a task
and conflicting objectives are two fundamental con-
ditions to be met for a principal-agent analysis to be
relevant. As far as public policies and more particu-
larly amalgamation policies are concerned, one may
question whether a conflict of objectives is empiric-
ally observed. Consequently, the aim of this paper
is to try to add a new empirical piece to this puzzle.
In the first part of this paper, the possible applica-
tions of the principal-agent model will be briefly re-
viewed. The conditions to be met for an application
of the model in the field of public policies will then
be discussed.Wewill finally focus on the conflicting
goals assumption in order to set the hypothesis we
seek to test. The second part will present the methods
used based on data issued from an amalgamation
project of two Swiss municipalities in the canton of
Neuchâtel. The data and methods will allow us to
test our hypothesis. In the third part, we present the
results obtained by mean of three tables. We finally
draw some theoretical and empirical conclusions but
also discuss on the limitations and possible future
extensions of our analysis.
Amalgamation of Municipalities as a
Principal-Agent Problem: Do the
Objectives Conflict?
The principal-agent framework has been successfully
applied in traditional fields of industrial economics.
1 One should be aware that principal-agent model may describe different concepts depending on the discipline or the context which is
considered, e.g. while in economics a principal-agent relationship defines a problematic situation of task delegation where inefficiencies
may arise and which requires a contracting or monitoring solution to be found, in juridical science this concept refers to a precise and well-
established fiduciary relationship in the Common Law tradition with a clear body of legal theory. According to this legal theory, the objectives
of the principal and agent are not supposed to conflict. Hence a principal-agent relationship shouldn’t lead to an inefficient situation.
2 Note that this concept of agent is not restricted to a single person or individual but may refer to groups of actors as well. Delegation of a
task may effectively concern a group of persons and an individual or two groups of persons (e.g. shareholders to CEO, citizens to govern-
ment…).
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Private relationships like stakeholder-manager or
manager-worker relationships are typical cases that
have been analysed using the principal-agent model
(Laffont andMartimort. 2002: 29). Furthermore this
powerful analytical tool has increasingly been used
for the analysis of the public sector and public
policies. In fact, the nature of public sector and
public policies allows for a great deal of applications
of this theoretical framework since delegation rela-
tionships are numerous in the public sector. For ex-
ample, a common application of the principal-agent
model in the public sector is the analysis of the rela-
tionship between the government and the administra-
tion or within the different levels of the administra-
tion. As an illustration, Imbeau (2003: 6) describes
the budgeting process of a public university as mul-
tiple principal-agent relationships, or “chain of del-
egation”, going from the electorate of a jurisdiction
to the university’s department through the parliament,
government, administration…
Some authors have also applied this model to the
local public sector considering the local population
as the principal that delegates the fulfilment of public
policies to the local government, i.e. the agent.
Megdal (1983) analyses the impact of referenda on
local expenditure behaviour in a framework where
elected or appointed representatives act on behalf of
the citizens of their jurisdictions. More recently,
Bravo Santos and Silvestre establish a model where:
“the incumbent political party, which is responsible
for local government, acts as an agent while local
voters are the principals. The incumbent politician
faces a threat of entry by the opposition party in the
next elections, just like the manager in a firm faces
the threat of a take over” (2004: 2). Conversely some
authors have put into question this application of the
principal-agent framework for describing the interac-
tion between population and its leaders. Lane (2003)
suggests that required conditions for such an applic-
ationmay often not be met. Lane argues for example
that : “only in countries with established democratic
politics is it possible to interpret the leaders as the
agents and the population as the principal. In systems
with traditional authority or in modern authoritarian
regimes the talk about principal and agents amounts
to nonsense” (2003: 3). Actually Lane’s point of
view gives support to the relevance of the principal-
agent framework for analysing local public policy
in Switzerland, which has strongly established direct
democracy system.
Lane argues further that vague content of such a
“political” contracting, inability to enforce the con-
tract and difficulty of precisely defining the contract-
ants plea against the application of the principal-
agent model to the public sector if considering the
population as the principal and the leaders as the
agent (Lane. 2003: 4). However, contrarily to what
Lane’s statements should imply, empirical studies
suggest that a principal-agent analysis of the local
public sector where the population is the principal
brings strong results. In an empirical analysis on 51
portuguese municipalities, Santos Bravo and Sil-
vestre conclude that the introduction of the agency
theory’s assumption offers an interesting insight into
local public choice models that deserves further re-
search (2004: 12).
In order to contribute to this empirical field of in-
vestigation, we will focus on the above-mentioned
condition that the objectives of the principal and the
agent are supposed to conflict. Through the delega-
tion of tasks, the local population expects from the
government that it fulfils the tasks according to the
population’s goals and not according to its own.
Hence, even if there effectively is an asymmetry of
information between the population and the govern-
ment, identical goals of both principal and agent
would lead to the efficient fulfilment of the task. In
this case, the prediction of the principal-agent model
that the delegation of a task leads to a non-optimal
allocation of resources would fail. Transposing this
to the case of amalgamations, identical goals between
the local government and the population would lead
the local government to work out an amalgamation
project that exactlymeets the population’s objectives.
In such a case, no significant problem would arise
from an asymmetry of information between the
principal and the agent and the principal-agent
model would not be considered as relevant. In this
respect, the interesting question is whether the goals
of the local government do indeed reflect those of
the population or not. Consequently, we set the hy-
pothesis to be tested in this paper as the following:
"The goals addressed by the local government in an
amalgamation project do not reflect those of the
local population". Whether this hypothesis is con-
firmed or not may have some implication for the
relevance of the principal-agent analysis. Should the
hypothesis be rejected, the risk of failure of the am-
algamation project at the polls – in a context of dir-
ect democracy – would remain low. Consequently,
the local government could simply work out a project
according to its own goals and submit it to the popu-
lation which should accept it. In such a case, a prin-
cipal-agent analysis would seem irrelevant because
no inefficiency would arise from a delegation of the
task “amalgamation” to the government by the pop-
ulation.
Should the hypothesis be confirmed, this would
confirm the existence of a discrepancy between the
populations’ and the local governments’ goals per-
taining amalgamation projects. Insofar as the goals
of the government cannot be observed by the local
population – which may reasonably be assumed –
an analysis of the relationship between the population
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and the government using a principal-agent model
would appear to be relevant in the field of amalgam-
ation policies.
To test the previously stated hypothesis and to in-
fer conclusions for the relevance of the principal-
agent model, we now turn to the presentation of some
data collected during an amalgamation project of
two Swiss municipalities.
Data from the Amalgamation of Two
Swiss Municipalities
For historical and geographical reasons, the Swiss
local state level is characterized by the small size of
its municipalities compared to those in Europe.
Among other European countries, only France,
Slovakia, Iceland and the Czech Republic have as
many small municipalities (Steiner. 2002: 176). In
a context of constant change, this situation makes it
difficult for local governments to perform their tasks.
A larger size, for example, creates economies of scale
in the provision of public services, minimizes
spillover effects and professionalizes local authorities
and office employees.
One way to address this problem is to increase the
size of municipalities by amalgamating two or more
of them. In the last decade, amalgamation has been
the solution that many Swiss cantons (i.e., the region-
al Swiss level) have chosen to handle the problem
of their constitutive municipalities being too small.
Recently, the canton of Neuchâtel implemented an
amalgamation policy. In this case, the constitution-
ally guaranteed existence of municipalities does not
allow the cantonal government to force the municip-
alities to merge. Consequently, an amalgamation
process may arise only in a bottom-up way and from
a voluntary decision of the municipalities. In fact the
canton of Neuchâtel faces the emergence of several
projects among which we can study the one pertain-
ing to the municipalities of Corcelles-Cormondrèche
and Peseux. This project is particularly suitable for
testing our hypothesis. Since we acted as consultant
in every step of the project, we were able to collect
not only data about the goals of the members of the
local government but also data about the population's
expectations towards the amalgamation project.
Hence, this empirical material will allow us to ana-
lyse whether there is a gap between citizens’ goals
and the government’s motivation pertaining to an
amalgamation project.
In the first step of the project, data pertaining to
the population was obtained by means of a survey
of the populations of both municipalities 3. The pur-
pose of such a survey was to gauge the opinion of
the respective populations in order to ascertain
whether it was worth proceeding with the project.
The citizens were asked to identify their three main
expectations and their three main fears about the
prospect of a closer collaboration or even an amal-
gamation, from the list of items below4 :
• prospects for development (improvement/deteri-
oration)
• services supplied by the municipality (improve-
ment/deterioration)
• production costs of services and taxes (in-
crease/decrease)
• power of the municipality towards the canton or
other municipalities (gain/loss)
• control of the authorities and administration by
the citizens (gain/loss)
• sense of attachement to her or his community,
i.e. municipality (gain/loss)
• interest in municipal politics (increase/decrease)
For each of those items, four different situations may
arise: the citizen has neither expectation nor fear, the
citizen has only an expectation, the citizen has only
a fear, or finally the citizen has an expectation as
well as a fear simultaneously5. The proportion of
citizens identifying an item as a source of expectation
and/or fear provides information about the weight
or relevance of this item for the population: the
higher the percentage, the more relevant the item.
Thus, the proportion of responses to each item
provides us with a measure of the population's goals.
The data pertaining to the authorities was collected
during the second step of the project. The purpose
of this second step was to evaluate whether an amal-
gamation is really the suitable solution for the muni-
cipalities or whether another solution would be
preferable. To perform this evaluation we used a
method developed by Soguel et Léchot (2006) and
based on five different analysis axes. These axes seek
to cover every dimension at stake in an amalgamation
project. We first use a so-called "Development and
Leadership" axis, which evaluates whether an amal-
gamation is able to improve the development pro-
spects of the municipalities and to increase the lead-
ership power towards other jurisdictions. The second
axis pertains to the dimension of "Public Opinion
and Local Identity" of an amalgamation, which
measures the compatibility of the amalgamating
municipalities in their political orientations and their
3 For the detailed results of the survey, see Beutler, T., and Soguel, N. (2006). Citizens’ expectations and fears regarding municipal amal-
gamation: the case of two Swiss municipalities: IDHEAP.
4 The items are coherent with those mentioned by Keating, M. (1995). Size, Efficiency and Democracy: Consolidation, Fragmentation and
Public Choice. In D. Judge, G. Stoker, and H. Wolman (Eds.), Theories of Urban Politics. pp. 117-134. Thousand Oaks and New Delhi.
5 For example the same citizen may expect or hope the amalgamation will make the tax rate decrease but may simultaneously fear the
amalgamation will in fact make the taxe rate increase.
387FLORIAN CHATAGNY, NILS SOGUEL
feelings of self-identity. The third axis, "Finance",
measures the financial compatibility of the amalgam-
ating municipalities. The two last axes analyse
whether an amalgamation could increase the effi-
ciency of the provision of services by the municipal-
ities. The fourth axis, "Decision about the Services",
evaluates the room for improvement in the quality
of the decision-making process relating to the ser-
vices supplied. This evaluation should determine
whether an amalgamation would improve the satis-
faction of the citizens' needs. The last axis, "Produc-
tion of the Services", analyses whether amalgamation
can create economies of scale and hence offer differ-
ent services more efficiently.
In order to perform the analysis as correctly as
possible, the members of the local government were
asked to weight the different axes according to their
own priorities. The governments’ members first had
to order the different axes according to their priorit-
ies. They then had to give a subjective evaluation of
the importance of the gap between each axis. The
estimated weights by each member of the govern-
ment were finally quantified by mean of the
MACBETH (Measuring Attractivness by a Categor-
ical-based Evaluation Technique) algorithm (Bana
e Costa and Vansnick. 1999). The results of this
weighting process provide us with a quantitative
measure of the goals on which the authorities are
focusing through the amalgamation project. We can
then sum the weights to obtain a single measure for
the local government as a whole.
Finally, the test of our hypothesis consists of
comparing the data for the population with those
obtained for the local government. If we observe
some significant discrepancies, then the hypothesis
will be verified. Conversely, if it appears that the
population and authority place weight on the same
items, the hypothesis will be rejected. The next sec-
tion presents the results obtained.
The Discrepancy between the
Population’s and the Government’s
Goals
The results will be presented in three steps. We first
give a presentation of the relative proportions ob-
tained with respect to the expectations and fears of
the citizens (table 1). Secondly, we present the data
obtained from the local government through the
weighting of the axes (table 2). Finally, we reformu-
late the data for the population according to the pre-
viously described axis method in order to make them
comparable with those of the government (table 3).
This final data comparison will allow us to properly
test our hypothesis. We will then discuss the con-
sequences of these results for the use of the principal-
agent model for public policies analysis.
Table 1 presents the proportion of the population
that mentioned each item as an expectation, a fear,
or an expectation and a fear simultaneously. The
elements in the table represent an estimation of the
relevance of each item for the population of both
municipalities. The first interesting result is that both
populations have very similar opinions. The most
important discrepancy is Identification, with a differ-
ence of seven percentage points. For both populations
the most relevant item is by far the item pertaining
to the costs of services and taxes. Note that the last
column mentions the analysis axis to which each
item belongs. Three items are related to the Develop-
ment and Leadership axis. In order to make the data
comparable with those of the government we will
then sum up those three features and calculate the
mean.
Table 1 : Data from the Population's Survey
Analysis axis corresponding to the itemsShares in %
Items relative to expectations and/or fears PeseuxCorcelles-C.
Finance (FIN9494Costs of services and taxes
Production of the Services (PROD-S)7273Services supplied by the municipality
Development and Leadership (D&L)6665Perspectives of development
Development and Leadership (D&L)4854
Power towards canton and oth. municipalit-
ies
Public Opinion and Local Identity
(PO&LI)4754Identification with the municipality
Development and Leadership (D&L)3841Interest for municipal politics
Decision about the services (DEC-S)3941Control on authorities and administration
404422Total
Source : Beutler & Soguel (2006)
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The data regarding the members of the local govern-
ments were collected during a special weighting
session.Members were asked to weight the different
analysis axes according to their own priorities. Table
2 shows the relative relevance of each axis for the
government6. The results indicate that for the govern-
ment an amalgamation project must clearly give
priority to the development and leadership dimension
as well as to the decision-making dimension relating
to services.
Table 2: Weighting of the Axis by the Government
Weight, in %Analysis axis
25Development and Leadership (D&L)
25Decision about the services (DEC-S)
18Finance (FIN)
18Production of the Services (PROD-S)
14Public Opinion and Local Identity (PO&LI)
100Total
Source : Soguel & Léchot (2006)
The sum of the weights for the government is exactly
100, which is not the case for the population. To
make the data comparable, we normalised the sum
of the populations' proportions to 100 and calculate
the relative weights. We can then compare the
weights of the populations and the local government.
Table 3: Comparison between the Populations’ and the Government's Data
Weights, in %
Analysis axis
Population
GovernmentCorcelles-C.Peseux
183031Finance (FIN)
182324Production of the services (PROD-S)
251717Development and Leadership (D&L)
141716Public Opinion and Local Identity (PO&LI)
251313Decision about the services (DEC-S)
100100100Total
Sources : Soguel et Léchot (2006), Beutler et Soguel (2006)
Table 3 shows the priority axes for both populations
as well as for the government. The axes are ordered
according to the populations' priorities. The aspects
related to finance and to the production of services
appear to be the most important concern for the
population. On the contrary, those aspects seem less
relevant to the government. Indeed, it puts more
weight on leadership and development as well as
decision making aspects, which clearly are not prior-
ities for both populations. Consequently, the results
of table 3 lead us to conclude that our previously set
hypothesis is verified, at least partly. That means we
observe a gap between the populations' and the
government's goals pertaining to an amalgamation
project7. Hence the targeted goals of the amalgama-
tion project worked out by the government could
diverge from those of the population. This situation
may create inefficiencies in the implementation of
the amalgamation project or even lead to a failure at
the polls in a system of direct democracy as it is the
case in Switzerland. From a theoretical point of view
this result tends to confirm the assumption of con-
flicting objectives, which is central to the principal-
agent model. Hence this paper clearly provides more
6 Note that although we dealt with two municipalities, table 2 presents a single indicator. This is due to the fact that the axes were weighted
simultaneously by both local governments. The composite indicator was obtained through a negociation between the members of both
governments.
7 Note that some empirical studies suggest that such a gap can also be observed between the government and the population on the one
hand and the administration on the other hand. In a 1998 survey, Steiner asked 2914 secretaries of Swiss municipalities about the advantages
of an amalgamation. They mentioned as a first advantage the possibilities of professionalization. The less often mentioned advantage was
the reduction of the tax burden (Steiner. 2002: 348). Hence the preoccupations of the administration pertaining to amalgamations seem to
be different than those of the population and government.
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empirical support for the use of the principal-agent
model in the field of local public policies, even if the
population is considered as the principal.
Conclusion
In this paper we sought to test whether the principal-
agent core assumption of conflicting objectives has
empirical relevance and more generally whether the
principal-agent model is a suitable framework for
analysing the local public sector and local public
policies. Our research hypothesis, i.e. "the goals ad-
dressed by the local government in an amalgamation
project do not reflect those of the local population",
was tested by comparing the objectives of both pop-
ulation and local government which we were able to
evaluate during an amalgamation project in which
we were involved. The presented data show the
emergence of a discrepancy between authorities and
population regarding the implementation of a public
policy, in this case an amalgamation project. As
predicted by the agency theory, such a situation may
lead to inefficiencies in the implementation of the
public policy in the sense that the amalgamation
project will not correspond to what the population
(the principal) expected from the government (the
agent). Furthermore, in a direct democracy frame-
work where the final decision often rests with the
population, the existence of such a gap drastically
increases the risk of failure at the polls, which would
represent an enormous waste of resources.
Before concluding our discussion, it is necessary
to mention some of the limitations of our analysis
and the way it could be improved in the future. First
of all, one should be careful when interpreting these
results in as far as they are more evenly distributed
for the government (18% to 25%) than for the popu-
lations (13% to 31%).
Moreover, generalities cannot be formed based
on the previous conclusions without taking several
points into account. Firstly, one should note that data
for the government and the population were obtained
using two different methods. Hence we cannot
guarantee that the same result would have been ob-
served if the same method had been applied to both
government and population. Unfortunately improving
this weakness of our study is far from easy because
applying the method used for the local government
– which is more precise – to the whole population
or to a representative enough sample would be too
costly.
Secondly, our test relates only to one case of am-
algamation and for one particular public policy, i.e.
amalgamation. Consequently, this result doesn’t
automatically hold for other municipalities or other
public policy in Switzerland. However, further pro-
jects of amalgamation should provide new data and
should allow us to assess our results. Comparisons
with amalgamation of municipalities in foreign
countries could also be interesting and could allow
us to control for institutional differences, for example
between direct and representative democracy. Unfor-
tunately we did not find any comparable data issued
from foreign amalgamation projects yet.
Thirdly, our data provide a static picture of the
objectives of both population and local government.
Hence, we cannot exclude that the observed gap in
objectives would decrease (or increase) when ap-
proaching the final decision on the project and its
implementation. A decreasing dynamic evolution of
the gap could reasonably be assumed in the Swiss
case since amalgamations are generally subjected to
referenda which put pressure on local governments
to develop policies that better meet citizens’ object-
ives. In this respect, time series data collected from
the same observed unit (i.e. municipalities) could
have brought us interesting insights. Once again
however, the cost of collecting such data did not al-
low us to collect it over time during the project.
Those limitations notwithstanding, this paper does
suggest that the agency theory analysis is relevant
in the field of (local) public policy and that the risks
induced by the existence of a gap between authorit-
ies’ and citizens’ goals should not be neglected. Even
in countries that do not have a direct democracy
system, disregarding the will of the population may
lead to a reprimand by the citizens in the shape of a
non re-election. Furthermore, taking citizens’ preoc-
cupations into account may help authorities to avoid
the emergence of inefficiencies and to achieve one
of their main task, i.e. satisfying citizens’ needs. But
the relevance of the principal-agent model in a rep-
resentative democracy framework – which is not
empirically considered in this paper – would need
further empirical evidence to be either verified or
rejected.
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